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to the handbook, the following 
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– A2-60 (6 pages)
Using Hedging in a Market-
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Standard Measurements  
– C6-84 (2 pages)
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Increased demand for corn from ethanol plants, short wheat crops, and stagnant 
South American soybean yields 
have led to $3.00 corn, $5.00 
wheat, and $6.00 soybeans. 
These high prices suggest that 
producers of these commodi-
ties should not expect any loan 
deficiency payments or counter-
cyclical payments for either their 
2006 or 2007 crops. If futures 
prices are any indication, then 
farmers might not see any pay-
ments from these programs for 
at least three or four years. High 
prices will not affect direct pay-
ments, of course. So $2.1 billion 
in annual aid will flow to corn 
farmers, $1.15 billion will go 
to wheat farmers, and soybean 
farmers will receive $608 million 
for both crop years despite the 
high prices.
A lack of payments is good news 
for farmers, our budget deficit, 
and our trading partners. Farm-
ers get to enjoy the benefits of 
high prices; the budget deficit 
will be relatively smaller; and 
our commodity programs will 
have minimal impact on world 
prices. However, high prices 
pose a dilemma for farm groups 
and their supporters in Con-
gress. The current set of pro-
grams was designed to generate 
payments to offset low prices. 
What should be done with our 
current programs if we are enter-
ing a period of high prices?
Although it is hazardous to 
forecast how Congress is likely 
to respond to high prices, past 
experience suggests a probability 
of near zero that Congress will 
declare the end of farm subsi-
dies. Three more likely options 
for Congress are:
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1. Declare victory over low prices but keep 
current programs and associated target prices 
in place just in case this victory is short-lived. 
2. Keep current programs but raise target pric-
es for all crops or for those crops that would 
not otherwise receive payments. 
3. Change farm programs so that they provide 
a better financial safety net, with payments ar-
riving when they are needed. 
Before turning to a more detailed look at each of 
these options, it might be instructive to see how 
Congress responded with changes in farm legisla-
tion in earlier periods of high prices.
Responses to High Prices in Previous 
Farm Bills
The commodity price boom in the mid-1970s re-
sulted in support levels that were far below market 
prices. Congress responded with farm legislation 
in 1973, 1977, and 1981 that increased loan rates 
and target prices. Before the boom, corn loan rates 
were $1.35/bu. At their peak, loan rates hit $2.55/
bu. Target prices for corn increased from $1.38/bu 
to a peak of $3.03/bu. The most common justifica-
tion for this rapid increase in price supports was to 
combat rising production costs.
In 1995, Congress was again faced with a choice 
about what to do in a period when market prices 
were above price support levels. At that time, 
strong export demand, a weak dollar, and produc-
tion problems resulted in high prices in 
1995 and 1996. Prices also were expected 
to remain strong for several years. Congress 
responded quite differently with the 1996 
farm bill. Rather than raise target prices, 
Congress eliminated the deficiency payment 
program and funded the direct payment 
program, assuring farmers of payments dur-
ing what was expected to be a strong price 
period.
The graph shows the history of total sup-
port levels and market prices for corn 
through 2005. (The pictures for wheat and 
cotton are similar.) The run-up in market prices 
during the 1970s was closely followed by a run-
up in support levels. The run-up in prices in the 
mid-1990s actually resulted in a brief decline in 
support, until the market loss assistance payments 
were paid out in 1998. The maintenance of sup-
port levels in 2002 is clearly revealed.
It is interesting to consider what U.S. agriculture 
would look like today had Congress simply left 
support prices at their 1970 levels. The overall 
pattern of market prices for corn would look 
largely as it does in the graph, with some excep-
tions. High government support prices in the early 
1980s undoubtedly expanded planted acreage, but 
annual set-asides somewhat counteracted these ef-
fects. The large buildup of stocks in the mid-1980s 
kept prices from rising higher than they otherwise 
would have in the drought year of 1988. And 
prices would not have risen as high as they did in 
the drought year of 1983 except for the large acre-
age reduction effort that year. But, especially since 
1996, the overall pattern of prices and production 
have been largely unaffected by the billions of dol-
lars in federal support given to corn farmers over 
this period. That is, if government had chosen to 
wean farmers from support in 1972, the U.S. Corn 
Belt would look mostly like it does today. The large 
run-up in commodity prices in the 1970s would 
have occurred. And we still would have had the 
farm crises in the mid-1980s, high prices in the 
mid-1990s, low prices in the late 1990s, and bum-
    
History of market prices and support prices for corn through 2005
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per corn crops in 1994, 2004, and 2005. Ultimate-
ly, what we have to show for the billions of dollars 
that have been spent supporting corn farmers are 
perhaps a bit higher corn production, somewhat 
higher land prices and wealthier landowners, and 
some cases in which farmers’ transition out of 
agriculture was made easier by payments. Whether 
these accomplishments are enough to justify the 
costs is an open question, but it is important to 
keep these long-run impacts in mind as we decide 
what to do with the next farm bill.
Three Alternative Paths
Extend the 2002 Farm Bill
For all the domestic and international criticism 
aimed at the 2002 farm bill, extension of its com-
modity provisions would represent a move to a 
free-market program regime for corn, soybeans, 
and wheat. The impact of the biofuels boom on 
the demand for corn should mean that market 
prices for all three commodities could remain 
above levels that trigger countercyclical and loan 
deficiency payments at current target prices and 
loan rates. Direct payments would still flow to 
producers, but these payments have little effect on 
planting decisions.
Maintenance of current target prices and loan rates 
would also give Congress and farmers assurance 
that a repeat of the late 1990s could not occur. 
Elimination of the deficiency payment program in 
1996 left only the nonrecourse loan program and 
AMTA (Agricultural Market Transition Act) pay-
ments to cushion the blow of low prices. Con-
gress felt that this was an inadequate cushion and 
passed emergency payments beginning in 1998 
and made permanent this level of support with the 
countercyclical payment program in 2002. Mainte-
nance of current programs at current target prices 
would mean that if prices were to return to the low 
levels of the late 1990s, then farmers would be as-
sured of large payments.
Depending on the intricacies of budget scoring, 
holding the line on target prices could free up 
funds for use in other areas of the farm bill, such 
as conservation, research, energy, nutrition, and 
rural development, where a good case can be made 
for spending scarce public funds on programs that 
serve broad public interests.
The most vocal advocate for extension of current 
provisions of the farm bill is the American Farm 
Bureau Federation. It will be interesting to see if 
Farm Bureau’s position will change this winter 
given that its farmer members who grow corn, soy-
beans, and wheat will be receiving few payments 
over the next few years.
Raise Target Prices
An alternative to simply extending current provi-
sions is to keep current programs but to “rebal-
ance” target prices. Soybean and wheat growers 
have received almost no support from countercy-
clical payments since this program’s inception, and 
corn farmers should not expect to see any support 
for the next few years. But rice and cotton produc-
ers likely will continue to receive both marketing 
loans and countercyclical payments.
Already, the National Association of Wheat Grow-
ers is advocating a 24 percent increase in the 
wheat target price. The two justifications they give 
for this proposed increase are that the current 
target price is too low given current market prices 
and that wheat farmers have simply not received 
their fair share of payments. The American Soy-
bean Association in an October 12 press release 
asks “Congress to correct inequities under the cur-
rent Farm Bill where target prices for oilseed crops 
are disproportionately low compared to other 
program crops.”
A rebalancing of target prices requires some idea 
of what should be in balance. Should target prices 
be set so that per-acre payments are equalized? 
Should they be set to reflect past market prices? 
Should target prices reflect production costs 
somehow? Or should they be balanced to mini-
mize their impact on planting decisions? When 
target prices are rebalanced, should cotton and 
rice prices be lowered or should we only consider 
increasing support levels?
A more fundamental question that should be ad-
dressed before target prices are raised is what ex-
continued on page 4
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actly is supposed to be accomplished by commodi-
ty programs. Does a lack of payments to wheat and 
soybean farmers (and corn farmers in the future) 
somehow mean that farm programs are failing? Or 
does it mean that wheat and soybean farmers do 
not need public support because market prices are 
high enough?
Using payment flow to farmers regardless of 
market conditions as a metric of success of farm 
programs is consistent with what we know about 
the long-term impacts of farm programs discussed 
earlier--higher land prices, wealthier landowners, 
and easier transition of farmers out of agriculture. 
That is, if all farm programs are supposed to ac-
complish is to make land prices higher than what 
market returns would otherwise dictate, then an 
increase in target prices to assure continued pay-
ments would be justified.
Improve the Farm Safety Net
Rarely if ever do we hear anyone argue that in-
creased land prices are the goal of commodity 
programs. Rather, we most commonly hear leaders 
talk about the need for a secure farm safety net to 
help farmers withstand unexpected financial stress. 
The biggest source of financial stress to wheat 
and soybean producers since passage of the 2002 
farm bill has been low yields caused by multi-
year drought, not low prices. And legislators from 
wheat country have been the strongest advocates 
of a new disaster assistance program.
The growing support for yet another disaster assis-
tance program is evidence that Congress has failed 
to make subsidized crop insurance the centerpiece 
of a farm safety net. Despite billions of dollars in 
premium subsidies, billions of dollars subsidizing 
agent commissions, and billions of dollars sub-
sidizing the risk-taking of crop insurance com-
panies, Congress seems poised to spend billions 
more on some sort of disaster package.
The third alternative approach that Congress 
could take with the 2007 farm bill is to change 
farm programs to eliminate any holes in the farm 
safety net. There are three such holes that could be 
filled: uninsured acreage, the large crop insurance 
deductible, and the impact of multi-year losses on 
crop insurance guarantees.
Uninsured acreage could be remedied by simply 
extending insurance protection to all who desire 
it by making it part of the farm bill. High deduct-
ibles are necessary in a crop insurance program 
because they discourage cheating. However, the 
most popular crop insurance program among Il-
linois corn producers in 2006, Group Risk Income 
Protection (GRIP), has low deductibles because it 
insures county revenue rather than farm revenue. 
Also, because GRIP bases its guarantee levels on 
long-term trend yields, two or three consecutive 
years of low yields in a county have no impact on 
a farmer’s guarantees.
A farm policy that simply gave a GRIP-style policy 
to producers would thus provide the basis for a 
sound safety net that would eliminate any eco-
nomic justification for disaster assistance pro-
grams. The cost of giving GRIP to producers would 
be relatively modest compared to running GRIP 
through the crop insurance program. On a per-acre 
basis, taxpayers currently support GRIP in the crop 
insurance program with subsidies to premiums, 
delivery costs, and reinsurance costs at such a level 
that farmers could be given a GRIP-based policy 
at the 94 percent coverage level in the farm bill 
at an equivalent cost. If this were done, then the 
one remaining safety net hole would be variations 
in farm yield not reflected in county yields, also 
called yield basis risk. This remaining risk could 
be largely covered by new crop insurance products 
offered by crop insurance companies.
A growing number of groups, including the Ameri-
can Farmland Trust and the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, advocate reform of farm policy 
around some sort of revenue insurance program. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the National Corn Grow-
ers Association is also considering supporting this 
kind of reform. The groups’ proposals vary, but 
they all have in common the idea that commodity 
programs should be designed to deliver a sound fi-
nancial safety net for farmers and that rural Amer-
ica would be better served by greater emphasis on 
the other titles in the next farm bill. 
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